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ABSTRACT 
This paper develops a multi-stage game-theoretic model of three-party 
competition under proportional representation. The final policy outcome 
of the game is generated by a non-cooperative bargaining game between the 
parties in the elected legislature. This game is essentially defined by 
the vote shares each party receives in the general election, and the 
parties' electoral policy positions. At the electoral stage parties and 
voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative 
implications of any electoral outcome. We solve for equilibrium electoral 
positions by the parties and final policy outcomes. 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
ELECTIONS, COALITIONS, AND 
LEGISLATIVE OITTCXlMES 
David Austen-Smith 
Jeffrey Banks 
Spatial theories of  elections and legislatures are now 
wel l-establ ished, i .f not thoroughly worked out [for recent reviews, see 
Shepsl e  (1986) , Calver t ( 1986),  Austen-Smi th (1983)]. For the most 
par t, theories of e lections and theories of legislatures have developed 
independent of one-another. This is unfortunate because, inter alia, 
voters are interested in policy outcomes, not pol i cy promises. And 
pol icy outcomes are determined within an elected l egislature which 
typica l l y  c9mprises representatives of several districts or pol i tical 
par ties . Rational voters, therefore, wi l l  take into account the 
subsequent legislative game in making their decisions at the electoral 
stage of the process . In turn, rational candidates wi l l  take account of 
such del iberations in selecting their electoral strategy and subsequent 
legislative behavior condi tional on electoral success . So, to 
understand more ful ly both electoral and legislative behavior - in the 
sense of being abl e  to explain and predict pol icy posi tions, pol icy 
outcomes, and coal i tion structures - i t  is necessary to develop a theory 
of both pol i tical arenas simul taneously. 
Thi s  paper makes a modest attempt at such a goal. We describe a 
2 
mul ti-stage game-theoretic model of electoral and legislative behavior 
where three parties are competing for votes in a propor tional 
representation (PR) system . We ini tial ly solve for the equ i l ibria of a 
non-cooperative bargaining game among the parties at the l egislat ive 
stage, and then analyze the equ i l ibria at the electoral stage, where the 
payoffs to the participants are those induced from the equ i l ibrium 
behavior at the legislative stage. 
The rationale for starting with the as!;\nption of PR is two-fold :  
f irst, i t  al lows us to examine coali tion formation in legislatures using 
the party as the unit of analysis;  second, the discreteness problem 
induced by any plural i ty system is absent - i . e . ,  under PR, the number 
of legislative seats won by a party may be treated as essential ly 
proportional to the number of votes that party attracts . And in 
addi tion to PR being an important electoral mechanism in most of western 
continental Europe, there is renewed analytical interest in PR and other 
al ternative rules to simple majori ty or plural i ty voting [e. g. Sugden 
( 1984), Greenberg and Weber ( 1985)]. But, to our knowledge, in al l of 
this work the voters are assumed to vote over candidates and not over 
final pol icies . As the remarks above suggest, this is a 
misspeci fication of the choice set .  A l though candidate characteristics 
other than pol icy positions surely matter in elections [Enel ow and 
Hinich ( 1 984)], i t  is inappropriate to ignore the legislative 
impl ications of electing one candidate over another, as is explici t ly 
done in the papers ci ted above. Likewise, whi l e  there are strategic 
models of legislative coal i tion formation and bargaining [ e . g .  Riker 
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{ 1962) , McKelvey, Ordeshook, and Winer { 1978), . Schofield { 1985)] ,  none 
of these expl ici t ly consider the electoral impl ications of the 
legis lative behavior s tudied . 
1be notion that a pol i t ical model should involve both e lectoral and 
legislative stage is of course not new. Downs { 1957) examines a fairly 
informal model in which a legislature is  formed via PR , and then simple 
majori ty voting wi thin the legislature determines the government .  His 
conclusions are imprecise and vague , and his focus is  more on showing 
how any voter ' s decision calculus is made more difficu l t  when, at the 
electoral s tage , the voter is ignorant of the eventual coali tion 
structure in the legislature .  Robertson { 1977) analyzes a 
mul ti-dis trict model in which the party whose candidates win the most 
districts controls the legislature . 1bus , it is evidently not sensible 
for a party to maximize votes ; what matters is' obtaining a control l ing 
number of seats in the legislature . Wi th only two parties and simple 
majori ty voting in the legislature , there is no room for post-election 
coali tion-building . Recognizing thi s ,  rational voters vote on the basis  
of party, rather than candidate , pol icy . Sti l l, Robertson does not 
explo i t  a rigorous strategic model and his conclusions are 
correspondingly "broad-brush . "  
Austen-Sm i th { 1981 ) , ( 1984) , ( 1986) devel ops a sequence of 
mul ti-di s trict model s  in which simple plura l i ty voting in districts 
generates a legis lature , and voters vote on the basis  on legis lative 
pol icy outcomes . In Austen-Smith ( 1981 ) ,  there are several "Downsian" 
parties , where a l l  party candidates coordinate their  policy posi tions so 
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as to win control of the l egislature,  but the issue of coa l i tion 
formation at the legislative s tage is ignored . In Aus ten-Smi th { 1984) 
there are only two parties, a l l  candidates belong to one or other party, 
and candidates are free to adopt any policy they wish. Thus the 
analysis  focuses on the mechanism which aggregates 
candidates' electoral posi tions into party positions at the legislative 
stage . Fina l ly ,  in Austen-Smith (1986) i t  is assumed that a l l  
candidates i n  a mul t i-district , s imple plural i ty election are completely 
independent .  In this case , rational voters at  the electoral stage wi l l, 
given any l i s t  of candidate pos i tions, form es timates of {l) which 
legislature wi l l  form , (2) given a legis lature, which coa l i tion wi l l  
form, and (3) given a coa l i ti on ,  what wi l l  be the pol icy that i s  
implemented . In this  paper, the legis lative s tage is not formulated 
explici t ly ;  rather , each component is treated in an essenti a l ly 
probabi l istic fashion. 
In contrast ,  the model developed here provides a structure for 
solving for the pol i cy outcome from the formation of a given 
legislature , by pos i ting an ins t i tution in which the parties at tempt to 
form a government .  1be typical approach to predicting the formation of 
coa l i tions and pol i cy outcomes has been with the theory on cooperative 
games [cf . McKelvey, Ordeshook , and Winer . ( 1978) , Schofield { 1985) , 
inter al ia]. This approach avoids identifying which of the possible 
winning coa l i tions form , and instead generates fami l ies of  
coa l i tion/payoff combinations which satisfy certain stabi l i ty 
properties . Since our goal i s  to a l low the parties and voters to " look 
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ahead" to the future consequences of current actions , we prefer instead 
to adopt an approach which might give unique behavioral predictions at 
the legislative stage as a function the results from the e lectoral 
stage. Hence we adopt a non-cooperative approach to coal ition formation 
which , given the generic non-existence of the core , necessitates the 
imposition of some exogenous institutional structure to the problem. 
Thus we are trading off general ity in favor of analytic tractabi l ity ;  
this i s  in the spirit of recent work which examines outcomes as  a 
function of institutions as wel l  as preferences [e.g. Shepsl e  (1979), 
Ferejohn and Krehbiel  ( 1985)). 
The particular institutional feature we have in mind is the 
widespread convention of first asking the party with the largest number 
of votes to attempt to form a winning coal ition ;  i. e. a government 
(Parliaments of the World, vol. II, 2nd ed. , 1986, Table 39). If this 
party is un�uccessfu l ,  the party with the next largest number of votes 
is al lowed to try a form a government, and so on. In the event that no 
government i s  abl e  to form, a "caretaker" government forms which is  
assumed to  make the choice of  legislative outcomes "equitably". 
Once the general election results are determined, the mechanism 
described generates a noncooperative bargaining game in the legislature. 
Given parties ' e lectoral platforms, this game has a unique equ i l ibrium 
outcome for any di stribution of e lectoral votes across parties. An 
outcome in  the model is  a winning coalition ,  a legislative pol i cy 
position implemented by that coal ition ,  and a distribution of portfol ios 
across the coal ition. Since only one pol i cy can be implemented and 
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parties have d i fferent "preferences over what it should be, coa l ition 
governments are sustained partly through sharing the benefits of being a 
member of the government. These benefits are model led here as 
portfol ios, and a party can be induced to join a government and 
compromise over the pol icy choice by offering it  some portfol ios. Thus 
parties have an incentive to join a government other than 
pol icy-implementation alone. And, as we sha l l  see, this incentive is  
important in supporting equ i l ibrium policy positions. 
Voters in the model care about f inal pol icy outcomes and not about 
party platforms per se , or about the distribution of portfol ios in any 
resulting government. Voters are also presumed to be rational. Given a 
l ist of electoral platforms of parties and given the structure of the 
legislative bargaining game, voters can compute the final legis l atiye 
pol i cy decision as a function of the distribution of electoral votes. 
Therefore , given everyone else' s voting behavior, each individual wi l l
cast his or her vote to promote the f inal pol icy outcome he or she most 
prefers. In a two-party , s imple plura l i ty election , this amounts to 
voting sincerely over the party platforms. In a multi-party election 
with proportional representation, in which individuals cast at most one 
vote, sincere voting is typica l ly not rational [Austen-Smith ( 1987)) . 
Furthermore , such voting behavior effectively e l iminates any stable  set 
of party pol icy positions ; strategic (rational} voting here is necessary 
to support e lectoral equ i l ibria. 
In the next section we present the model of electoral and 
legislative behavior formal ly. We then provide a characterization of a 
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class of equilibria generated by the induced multi-stage game . 1bere 
are three features of the equ i l ibria identified worth anticipating: 
( 1) Given the electoral policy pos i tions, only the rank-order of 
the electoral vote-shares matters in determining the winning coa l i t ion 
(government) which emerges from the legislative bargaining process . 
Assuming no one party receives an overall majori ty of votes, the 
government will comprise the largest and smallest legislative parties ; 
the middle-ranked party in terms of votes will be excluded. Thus a 
party ' s  influence in the legislature is not monotonic in i ts vote share, 
and the winning coa l i tion may not be of minimum size in the sense of 
Ri ker ( 1 962) or connected in the sense of Axelrod ( 1970) . 
(2) 1be equ i l ibrium electoral policy posi tions of the par ties are 
symmetrically distributed around the median voter ' s most-preferred 
policy, wi th one party adopting this posi t ion to contes t  the e lection. 
1bis  par ty, ,however, receives the fewest votes. As a resul t, the
expected legislative policy outcome ( i . e. prior to the l egislative 
process being completed) is the median pos i tion, but the actual outcome 
in any election period wi l l  be skewed away from thi s point . 
(3) Not al l individual s  vote sincerely relative to the party 
posi tions in equilibrium . 1berefore, the equi l ibrium party vote-shares 
wi l l  not necessari ly ref lect the dis tribution of preferences of the 
electorate.  Furthermore, as the minimum number of  votes necessary for a 
party to be elected to the legislature goes down, the number of 
individual s  not voting sincerely goes up. 
Advocates of proportional representation of ten predicate their  
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arguments upon two premises . First, the composi tion of the legislature 
wi l l  mirror the preference distribution of the population at large ; 
second, legislative outcomes will ref lect the relative weights of the 
elected parties in the legislature [see Sugden ( 1984), pp . 31-33 for a 
discussion) . 1be resu l ts reported here suggest that nei ther of these 
premises may be wel l-founded. In the concluding section of this paper, 
we take up these issues at greater length . 
2. THE MODEL 
There are three parties, a, p, and �. where D={a, p. �}. competing on 
a one-dimensional pol icy space P Cm, for the votes from a f ini te set N 
of individual s .  Assume IPI ( 00, and IN l=n is sufficiently  l arge (� 15)
and odd . Let S(O) denote the set of all subsets of n. At  t ime t=-2, 
the parties simultaneously announce pol icy posi tions pk in P, where p 
(Pa•Pp·P�), and at t=-1 the voters each cast a s ingle bal lot  for one of
the three parties. 1be method of determining a legislature is by 
proportional representation, where a party n�ds at l east s votes to 
gain entrance to the legislature . We assume that s is odd and s € 
[3, l/3•n). Let  wk be the proportion of votes party k receives in the
e lection at t=-1, and let w = (wa, wp,w�). If one or more parties
receives less than s votes, we normal ize the weights of the remaining 
parties so that they sum to 1 .  For example, if  only party � gets l ess 
than s votes, then wa' = wa/(wa+wp)· For the fol lowing we assume that
all par ties receive at least s votes, so that we use the vector w rather 
than w' in estab l ishing legis lative influence. 
For a l l  coalitions C E  S(O) let wC = � wk '  and define kEC 
D(w) = {CES(O) wC ) 1/2} . 
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We assume that D(w) identifies the set of winning coalitions in the 
l egislature given the vector of seats w .  Also, for a l l  kEQ let 
Dk(w) = {CED(w) : kEC} 
be the set of winning coalitions of which party k is a member .  
From t=l on the parties attempt to form a government, or a winning 
coalition, which wil l  col lectively choose , i} a policy yEP and ii) a 
distribution of portfolios among the parties ,  which we characterize as 
choosing a distribution of a fixed amount G of transferable benefits 
across the parties ;  let 
A (G)={(ga , g�, g�) : gk�o. v kEQ and � gk = G} kEQ 
be the set of such distributions . The process by which a government is 
formed is as fol l ows : at t=l, the party with the largest number of seats 
proposes a coalition C1ED(w), a policy y1EP , and a distribution of
benefits g1EA(G), where g1=(gla 'gl�'gl�) .  The mem�ers of the coalition 
either accept or reject the proposal . If the parties which accept the 
proposal constitute a winning coalition , then they form a government, 
implement y1, and distribute g1 . If not enough parties accept the 
proposal , then at time t=2 the party with the second highest number of 
seats proposes a coalition , a policy , and a distribution of benefits ,  
and again the members o f  the proposed coalition either accept or reject . 
If a government has not formed after the t=3 proposal , then a 
"caretaker" government is implemented which "equitably" makes the policy 
and benefits decisions . 
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Given this description , then , a strategy for party k consists of 
three elements : an e lectoral position pkEP, a proposal I'k E D(w)xPxA(G) , 
and a response strategy 
specifying whether or not party k accepts (1)  or rejects (0) a proposal 
which includes k in the coalition , where this response may be a function 
of the time [t=l , 2, 3] at which it is offered . Note that our definition 
of a proposal is ahistorical: whil e  a complete description of a strategy 
would imply the proposal being a function of past electoral positions , 
proposals, and responses, the nature of the model e liminates the 
necessity of carrying around this extra notation . Let I'= (I'a, r� , I'�) ,
and r = (ra , r� , r�) .  A strategy for voter i is a function 
ai : PxPxP -+ A(O} 
specifying the probability i votes for each party given their e lectoral 
positions . Let ai(p) = (ai(a) , ai(�).ai(�)) , where ai(k) is the 
probabil ity that voter i votes for party k, and 
Voters are assumed to be purely policy-oriented , with preferences 
characterized by quadratic utility functions ui(•) = u(•: xi) over the
pol icy space P, where xi is voter i
' s ideal point in P .  · It is assumed 
that x = (x1 , . . .  , xn) is common knowledge and ordered so that Vi< n, 
xi( xi+l '  Further, assume that voter ideal points are distributed
symmetrical ly about the median voter' s ideal point . Let µ = {n+l)/2 be 
the median voter . The assumption of quadratic preferences implies that , 
if the policy outcome from the l egislative stage is uncertain , but there 
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exists a probabi l i ty distribution p( • ) over P ,  then the expected uti l i ty 
for voter i is  
E
p
[ui( • )] = -(yp - xi)
2 - sP , 
where yp is the mean and sp the variance of the distribution p . 
Parties wi l l  have uti l i ty functions defined over A(G) as wel l  as , 
at the legis lative s tage , over P .  Ex ante , however , their pol icy 
preferences wi l l  be a function only of the difference between their 
electoral positions and the final pol icy outcome . The motivation for 
this is as fol lows : . voters and parties are actual ly engaged in a 
continuing relationship which spans a number of e lections . Voters 
therefore have the abi l i ty to condi tion future decisions on the past 
performance of the parties: in particular , they can condition their 
votes on the degree to which party promises ( i . e. electoral pos i tions) 
differ from the actual policy outcomes as a way of imposing costs on the 
parties at rhe legislative stage for deviating from their announced 
posi tions . Even if the parties are only concerned with winning 
e lections and col lecting the transferabl e  benefits ,  future benefits wi l l  
be a function of the current difference between the electoral pos i tion 
of a party and the final pol icy outcome from the legislature if the 
voters adopt these "retrospective" s trategies . Hence rational parties 
wi l l  take this  difference into account when choosing electoral posi tions 
and legi s lative proposals . Since i t  is in the interes t of the voters to 
adopt these strategies, i t  seems consistent ,  in a "single-election" 
model ,  to characterize party preferences in the manner that we do . 
Thi s  assumption also impl ies that , if a party receives less than s 
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votes and hence is  not represented in the legislature , thei r  payoff 
would not be a function of the final pol icy outcome. Thus we assume 
that party preferences are represented by a u ti l i ty function taking on 
the values Uk(y , g ; p) if elected and -c otherwise , where later we assume 
that the "cost" c is  sufficiently large . The function Uk i s  assumed to
be quasi-l inear , i . e .  additively separable and l inear in gk ' and 
quadratic in y :  
where pk i s  the e lectoral posi tion o f  party k. Again , use of quadratic
uti l i ty functions impl ies that the expected uti l i ty for party k 
generated by the distribution p( •) over P and f{•) over A{G) is  
Ef, p
[Uk{• , •: p)] = g! - (yp - pk)2 - SP, 
where yP and sp are defined as above , and g! i s  the mean value of gk 
with respect to the distribution f .  
A sequential equ i l ibrium t o  this game wi l l  consist  o f  voter and 
party s trategies which are optimal for each participant at every point 
in time , given the assumed equ i librium behavior of the others. To 
characterize these equ i l ibria we first determine the equi l ibrium 
behavior at the legislative stage for any vectors p of pol i cy pos i tions 
and w of party weights . By the sequential nature of the decision-making 
at the legislative s tage, we ini tial ly solve for the optimal proposals 
and responses at time t=3. This then al lows us to solve for the optimal 
behavior at t=2 as a function of the optimal behavior to occur at t=3 ,  
and so on. As we shal l see , the equi l ibrium prediction for the 
legi slative s tage wi l l  in general be unique for any (p , w) . Therefore , 
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for any P and set of voting strategies a(p), voters can deduce the final 
legislative outcome . This a l l ows us to analyze equilibrium behavior at 
the voting stage, for a l l  party positions p, by solving for the optimal 
behavior of the voters .  In equilibrium , the vector o f  party weights w 
wil l  be a known function of the party positions p, where this functional 
relationship wil l  be determined by the voting strategies a .  This then 
constitutes the basis for analyzing the competition among the parties at  
the electoral stage as  wel l ,  since now the legislative outcome is a 
function only of the positions the parties choose . 
In the next section we initial ly describe the equilibrium behavior 
at the legislative s tage ,  and then work back to the voting and electoral 
s tages . 
3 .  EQUILIBRIUM BEHAVIOR 
Equilibrium legislative outcomes 
As described above, in this section the vector of party policies 
P = (pa, p� ,p�) and weights w = (wa, w�, w�) are treated parametrical ly .
It  wil l  be  convenient to  relabel the parties according to  their relative 
positions on the policy space P .  Let pL = min {pa ,p� , p�}, pM = mid
{pa, p�, p�}, PR = max {pa ,p�, p�} ;  similarly define wL, wM ' and wR as the 
weights of the left, middle, and right parties, respectively, and let O 
= {L, M ,R} .  If the weights o f  any two parties are equal,  while the 
remaining party has l ess weight ,  then it is assumed that prior to t=l a 
fair coin is f lipped to decide which party wil l make the t=l proposal ; a 
similar assumption holds when the two parties have the lowest weight or 
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when al l parties have equal weight .  Most o f  the fol lowing analysis wil l  
focus on the case where each party has a distinct electoral position ; 
however, the outcomes when some of the positions coincide are easily 
derived from Proposition 1. 
If only two parties receive the necessary s votes, then as 
discussed in Section 2 the weights of the parties in the legislature are 
normalized to ref lect this fact . Thus the party with the higher vote 
share wil l  hol d  a majority of the seats in the legis lature . If the 
parties have the same vote shares, then it is assumed that the coin flip 
determines who wil l  hold the majority in the legislature . In what 
fol l ows we assume that a l l  three parties receive at l east s votes ; given 
the above description of events the subsequent analysis is easily 
extended to the case where only two parties are represented. 
We assume that G is sufficiently large (� I P l2) so that it is always 
possible  for a coalition to form at any time, and fur ther that any 
caretaker government has the ability to, and in fact would ,  choose a 
policy yEP and a distribution gEA(G) such that the utilities for the 
parties are al l equal to 0 in the event of no agreement at t=l , 2, or 3. 
Note that we could have equivalently assumed that there exis ted a 
positive coefficient on the linear term in the parties ' utility 
functions and, rather than assuming that G was sufficiently large, 
assume that this coefficient were sufficiently large. 
If any party has a majority of the seats , say for example party L, 
it is clear that the only equilibrium is for that party to choose y1 
PL and g1L= G, since it needs no other party to form a government . 
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Furthermore, by the assumption of complete information with regard to 
the payoffs of the par ties, we need only consider minimum winning 
coalitions, so that a l l  members of a proposed coalition must agree to 
the proposal . 
Suppose par ty k is at tempting to form a government .  I n  order to 
induce party j to agree to a proposal,  party k mus t  offer j at l east as 
much as j could get by rejecting k ' s  proposal; i. e. , party j ' s 
opportunity cos t of joining the coalition. Let  u� be party j ' s J 
oppor tunity cost at time t .  I t  is clear from the above assumptions that 
3 3 3 
UL = UM = uR = 0, since by rejecting a proposal at t=3 each party
guarantees a payoff  of 0 from the ensuing caretaker government. If  a 
government would implement (y3, g3) at t=3, then the opportunity cost for
party k at t=2 wil l  be determined by k ' s utility from the outcome 
2 {Y3•g3) :  i . e. uk = Uk{y3, g3;p), since this is the utility k would
receive fro� rejecting a proposal at t=2. Similarly, if  (y2,g2) would
be implemented at t=2, then ut = Uk(y2,g2;p).
In general the parties ' opportunity costs wil l  depend on the 
responses of the parties to subsequent proposal s. 
o{C, y, g, t) = rr rk{C, y, g, t)k€C 
Let 
be the product of party responses to a proposal of (C, y,g) at time t; 
thus o(C, y,g, t) wil l  be 1 if al l parties agree to the proposal and 0 
otherwise . Since only minimum winning coalitions wil l  be proposed 
o(C,y, g, t)  is sufficient to deduce whether a government wil l form at t .  
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Definition Given proposals  I' and responses r, the oppor tunity cost of  
t party k at time t, uk(f, r) ,  is 
0 
Given a list I' of proposals, then, we can inductively define equilibrium 
responses for the par ties . To determine the equilibrium proposals for 
the parties, define 
as the utility for party k generated by the proposal rk 
is accepted. 
(C,y, g) if I' 
Definition A legislative equilibrium consists of response strategies 
* * * * * * * * 
r { • ) = { rL{ • ), rM{•) , rR{ • ) )  and proposal s  r = {fL, rM, fR) such that V t,
v k E n. 
1 
i) 
0 e l se 
The logic of this definition fol lows from the sequential nature of the 
* 
actions : since rk( • , 3) is known for al l k€0, the optimal proposal from
the party with the lowest weight can be explicitly solved. This then 
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* generates rk( • , 2),  so that the optimal proposal at t=2 can be solved , 
and so on. 
The presence of perfect information guarantees that, in 
equilibrium , if there exists a proposal at t=3 which gives the party 
with the l owest weight and some other party non-negative u tility, then 
the equilibrium proposal at t=3 wil l be accepted; similar l ogic holds 
for t=2 and t=l. Furthermore, if parties k and j agree to form a 
coalition at t=k, it must be that the proposal (yk, gk) is such that yk 
lies between pk and pj and gkk+ gkj= G; in words , the proposal must be 
Pareto-efficient for the coalition C={k, j}. Also ,  if j accepts k' s 
proposal , then it must be that either j is receiving exactly his 
opportunity cos t, or yk = pk and gkk=G , since otherwise k could offer j 
less than gkj or a policy closer to pk and sti l l  gain j
' s acceptance.
The assumption that G is sufficiently large relative to I P I implies that
in equil ibrium the proposal by the party with the highest weight wil l  be 
accepted at an outcome which is either "first-best" for that party or 
makes the joining party indifferent between accepting and rejecting the 
proposal .  [This i s  typical of bargaining models  with perfect 
information, Rubinstein ( 1982)]. To determine who wil l join this party 
and at what outcome, then , we need to analyze the equilibrium proposals 
at t=3 and t=2 decisions to generate the opportunity costs of the 
par ties at  t=l. 
Suppose that wL ) WM ) WR ' so that par ty 
R has the lowest weight,
and hence makes a proposal at t=3, if no government has yet formed. 
Given the form of the parties' utility functions, it is clear that party 
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R wil l  attempt to form a coalition with the party whose e lectoral 
position pj is c l osest to pR ' since the oppor tunity costs of the other
parties are equal .  Thus , in this case, R would attempt to form the 
coalition {M, R}. Since R cannot  implement y = PR and gRR = G, R chooses
(y3, g3) to solve
2 2 max gR - (y - pR) + A{G - gR - (y - pM) ) ,  y€P, gRE[O, GJ.
y , g  
Since the utility functions are separable and quadratic in y ,  the 
solution to the above optimization wil l  be 
* � -Y3 = 2 = PRM' 
Thus , if a government has not formed at t=l , 2 ,  then at t=3 the policy 
outcome of the government wil l  be the midpoint between the e lectoral 
positions of R and M, whil e  the benefits G wil l  be distributed in such a 
way as to give M a utility of exactly 0 ; i.e. M ' s opportunity cos t.
[Note:  this solution holds if we weaken the assumption on preferences 
from quadratic to symmetric concave utilites over policy. ] 
Notice that this logic is quite general; for any (p,w), the 
equilibrium proposal at t=3 wil l  be such that the policy y is the 
midpoint between the electoral positions of the party with the l owes t  
weight and the par ty with the nearest electoral position. 
At t=2, then , the oppor tunity costs of the parties wil l  be 
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2 2 2 2 2 
UL = -(pRM - PL) , uM = 0, and uR = G - 2{pR - pRM) . Thus, 
party L 
will accept a proposal which is "first-best" for party M, y = PM and gM 
= G, since this gives L utility of -(pM - pL)
2, which is greater than 
2 -(pRM - PL) ' 
1 2 1 1 2 At t=l, then, uL = -(pM - pL) , uM = G, and uR = -(pR - PM
) , 
implying that at t=l the coalition {L,R} will form , since party M ' s 
oppor tunity cost at t=l implies that L could never make a proposal which 
would keep M indifferent while making L better off, but there do exist 
proposals which make both L and R better off . If dL = (PM - PL) � (pR -
PM) = dR ' then, as at t=3, the optimal proposal from party L at t=l will 
be such that y = pRL ' and 
R receives sufficient transferable benefits to 
meet its oppor tunity cost . If dL � dR ' then the optimal proposal would 
be to choose y = pM and gL = G, since this gives 
R precisely his 
oppor tunity cost and no other proposal would make L better off without 
making R wo�se off . Thus, if wL > WM ) wR ' the equilibrium policy will 
either be pM or pLR ' depending on the distances between the electoral
positions . 
Suppose instead that WM ) wL > wR . By the same logic as above, at
t=3 the coalition {M,R} would form, with policy y3 = pMR ' and benefits
2 (pMR - PM) , g3R = G - g3M . At t=2, then , the coalition {L , M} 
would form with some policy y2 € (pL, pM) ' where again the exact policy
will be a function of the distances between electoral positions. At 
1 t=l, then , the oppor tunity cost of party R, uR ' will be less than -(pR -
2 pM) ; hence R will accept a proposal by party M of yl = pM and glM = G .
Thus the equilibrium policy outcome when wM ) wL > WR will be y = PM ' 
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regardless of the distances between the electoral positions . 
Note that the above analysis applies directly to the symmetric 
cases where wR > wM ) wL and wM ) wR ) wL . The remaining cases, where
party M has the lowest weight, can be analyzed similarly, although in 
these cases the algebra is somewhat trickier .  
The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium coalitions c* 
and outcomes y*,g* from the legislative stage . The {lengthy) formal 
statement of the proposition can be found in the Appendix. 
Proposition 1 Let party k offer the proposal at t=l, party h at t=2, 
and party j at t=3 . 
* * (a) If k has a majority in the legislature, then y = pk ' gk = G ;
{b) I f  k does not have a majority, then c* = {k, j}, y* lies between 
pk and pkj , and 
2 (pk-pkj) 
0 else 
Thus in equilibrium it will always be the parties with the highest and 
lowest weights which form the governing coalition. The logic of this 
follows directly from the recursive nature of the analysis : the party 
with the middle weight is excluded precisely because it would make the 
t=2 proposal, thus implying a high opportunity cost at t=l and hence a 
degree of bargaining power vis-a-vis the party with the highest weight 
which exeeds that of the party with the lowest weight .  The 
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non-cooperative bargaining model of coalition formation developed here 
generates a unique coalition prediction, where this coalition is minimum 
winning, but is not of minimum size [Riker ( 1962)] and is not 
necessarily connected [Axelrod { 1970)] . I t  is worth remarking that 
these features are not peculiar to quasi-linear preferences . 
The cases in which the party with the lowest weight is in the 
middle and dL = dR yield a sequential equilibrium prediction which is 
non-unique . The reason for this is that, at t=3, party M is indifferent 
between forming a government with L or with R, since either will give M 
the same payoff. However, the equilibrium payoffs to M depend on 
exactly this choice at t=3 .  In particular, M receives a higher payoff 
if it would form with the party with the highest weight than it  would 
from forming with the party with the middle weight . The selection we 
make is the, equilibrium with the higher payoff for party M, since ex 
ante M could credibly threaten the party with the highest weight that it  
would take such an {equilibrium) action at t=3 if it  were called upon to 
do so . 
Equilibrium voting strategies 
Let y(w,p) be the equilibrium policy outcome from the legislative 
stage given the vector of weights w and positions p .  Define 
A {p) {yEP : y = y(w,p) for some w} 
to be the set of possible equilibrium policy outcomes given p .  The 
vector of weights w will be determined by the individual voting 
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behavior: in particular, assuming that all voters adopt pure strategies, 
for any kEfl, 
wk = l{iEN : ai{k)=l}l/N = 
vk{a{p))/N, 
where a{p)={a1 {p), . . .  ,an{p)) . Thus the probability of any specific 
policy in yEA{p) being the final outcome is a function of voter 
strategies: let v { • la,p) : A{p) � [0,1] denote this probability . 
Definition For any C€S{fl), with lcl�2 and any pEP
3, voter i's sincere
c strategy relative to C, ai{ •), is defined as 
a?{k') = 1 if and only if u . {pk,) > max ui{pk) .l l C\{k ' }  
Notice that if ICl=2, an individual who votes sincerely relative t o  C at 
p does not necessarily vote for the party offering his most preferred 
Definition A voting equilibrium is an n-tuple a*{p) such that V p, V 
iEN, V ai{p) : 
Ev{a*,p)[ui(y)] � E { * )[ui{y)] . v ai,a-i,p 
Thus, given p, a voting equilibrium is simply a Nash equilibrium to 
the game with players N and payoffs induced by the equilibrium behavior 
in the legislative game generated by p .  For simple-plurality, 
two-candidate electoral competition, Nash equilibrium is too weak a 
concept; it admi.ts equilibria which are suppor ted only by weakly 
dominated strategies. Consequently, in such games voter strategies are 
additionally required to be undominated. In the three-party 
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proportional representation game developed here, however, no strategy is 
weakly dominated. The reason for this is that, in contrast to the 
two-party case, the final outcome from the legislative game for any p is 
not monotonic in vote shares: given that no party has an overall 
majority, it is always the largest and smallest parties which form the 
government .  Thus requiring voter strategies to be undominated is 
vacuous here, even when two of the three parties adopt identical 
platforms. 
An example will illustrate th1' s fact . S 15 =3 d i uppose n= , s- , an xi= 
for all i=l, . . .  , 15 .  Suppose also that pL=PM=l l <pR=12 . Evidently,
ul (pM)>u1 (PR) .  I s  voting for 
R a dominated strategy for l ?  The answer 
is No . To see this, suppose individuals i=2, . . .  , 5  vote for L, 
individuals i=6, . . .  , 1 1 vote for M, and i=l2, . . .  , 15 vote for R . All 
these voter� are voting sincerely relative to the positions p = 
( 1 1, 1 1,12) . Since s=3, all parties get elected to the legislature in 
the absence of l's vote . If 1 votes sincerely for either L or M, then 
no party has an overall majority, and the legislative weights of the 
parties are wM>wL>wR if 1 votes for L, and wM>wL=wR if 1 votes 
M . By 
Proposition 1, the final policy outcome from the legislative bargaining 
process will be (pM+pR)/2 = 1 1 . 5  if 1 votes L, and will be (in
expectation) l/2• (pM+pR)/2 + l /2•pM = 1 1 . 25 if 1 votes M. Now assume 
votes for party R . Then wM>wR>wL ' in which case the final policy 
outcome is surely PM=l l .  Hence, individual 1 is better off voting for R 
in these circumstances than he is by voting sincerely. 
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So eliminating voting equilibria involving dominated strategies 
buys us nothing . Consequently, we make a selection from the set of 
voting equilibria which is simple, supports an intuitively reasonable 
class of equilibrium party positions (see below), and has two desirable 
properties . First, at any equilibrium set of party positions, every 
voter is decisive between at least two parties . Thus, although we 
cannot apply the "weak dominance" argument for all electoral positions 
p, in equilibrium each voter will have a non-trivial decision problem in 
that the final policy outcome will be a function of how he votes . 
Second, at any out-of-equilibrium party positions, the voting 
equilibrium strategies provide incentives for the parties to "move 
toward" the equilibrium positions . 
The voting equilibrium is described formally and in detail in the 
Appendix . For current purposes, and to provide a reference for later 
on, it is sufficient to identify the key features of the equilibrium 
informally. 
Proposition 2 A voting equilibrium a*(p) is well-defined for all p € 
PxPxP . I t  is such that at least one party is penalized ( in terms of 
votes) if, relative to the distribution of voter preferences : 
(a) any two parties are "too close", or 
(b) no party is centrally located, or 
(c) parties are " too dispersed", 
Together, (a), (b), and (c) insure that, in equilibrium, parties 
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will adopt dis tinct posi tions symmetrically distributed about the median 
of the voter distribution. Exactly what const i tutes being "too close" 
or "too dispersed" will become clear once we analyze the part ies' 
s trategic choice of electoral policy platforms. 
I t  is worth not ing that, in the voting equilibrium we select, no 
individual votes sincerely relative to 0 for all p € PxPxP. Moreover, 
as we remarked in the Introduction, if individuals are constrained 
always to vote sincerely, then there is no set of party posi tions which 
could be an equilibrium; given any set of party platforms p, there is  
invariably one party which can unilaterally improve i ts payoff by 
deviating from p. From a theoretical perspective, therefore, s trategic 
behavior on the part of the voters is  required to generate stable 
electoral outcomes. And there exists considerable empirical evidence 
for strategic voting in legislative elections [Riker ( 1982)]. 
Equilibr ium party posi tions 
We are now in a position to define the equilibrium path of the 
entire multi-stage game by analyzing the electoral game among the 
parties, where the payoffs are those induced by the equilibrium behavior 
of the voters at t=-1 and the subsequent equilibrium behavior of the 
parties at the legislative stage. Let 
* * * * tk(p) = E�(a*,p)
[Uk(y {w(a (p)) .p) ,g (w(a (p)) ,p) ;p) ] 
be the { expected) indirect util i ty for party k from the electoral 
posi tions p given the equilibrium behavior at the voting stage a*(·) and 
at the subsequent legislative stage y*( • ), g*( • ). 
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* * * * Defini tion An electoral equilibrium i s  a triple p =(Pa·P�·P7)
 such that
V kEO, V �EP, 
* * tk(p ) � tk(pk,p-k).
For any aEIR define int[a] as the smallest integer greater than or equal 
to a. 
* Proposi t ion 3 Relative to the voting strategies of Proposi tion 2, P € 
PxPxP is an electoral equilibrium for any s € [3,n/3), s odd, if and 
only i f  
* ( 1 )  PM = xµ
' 
* * * * ) )  (2) (� - PL) = (PR - PM) € [8/3•(xi* - xµ),4• (xj* - xµ , 
where i* = µ + ( s-1)/2, j* = µ + int[(n-1)/4]. 
Under the assumption of a symmetric distr ibution of voter ideal 
points, at any p* in this class, the equilibrium vote shares w{a*(•) )  
are 
WL = WR > WM' 
where party M receives exactly s votes. Consequently, from the analysis  
above, the equilibrium policy outcome from the legislative s tage will be 
either p� or p� . with each of these occuring with probabil i ty 1/2 due
to the equal weights of the extreme parties. Note that, by the 
assumption of quadratic utili ties, all of the equilibria in this  class 
are Pareto-inefficient; that i s, ex ante everyone would prefer the 
* * * outcome y = pM' gL = { l/2)•G = gR, s ince this gives the same� 
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utili ty as all the equilibria but at zero variance. 1be equilibrium 
which is Pareto-efficient among the class of equilibria is where the 
extreme parties adopt the innermost posi tions defined in (2) above. 
Figure 1 gives an example of equilibrium party posi tions along with 
the associated voting behavior of the electorate. Define x(d) as the
point in P such that, in an equilibrium where (pR-pM) = (pM-pL) = d, an 
individual with x(d) as an ideal point would be indifferent between 
voting for M and giving M precisely s votes, and voting for R and giving 
R a subsequent major i ty in the legislature. 1bus x(d) solves
-(x - x
µ
)2 - d2/4 = -(d - (x - x
µ
))2. 
Solving this, we get that 
x(d) = x
µ 
+ 3/S•d. 
Condi tion (2) then implies that M receives at least s votes, and x(d) � 
xi*; otherwise voter i
* would prefer to vote for R, thereby upsetting 
the equilibrium. To see that M receives exactly s votes, suppose that 
some voter i > i* were voting for M in an equilibrium described in 
Proposi tion 3. 1ben, by swi tching his vote to R, party M s till receives 
at least s votes, but now party R will surely make the f irst proposal in 
the legislature, thus implying that the policy outcome will be p wi th RM 
probabili ty 1 .  I t  i s  easy to see that this  outcome would be preferred 
by i to the proposed equilibrium outcome. 
4. Disa.JSSION 
From the perspective of pos i t ive pol i tical theory, li ttle is Jmown 
about the comparative proper ties of proportional representation and 
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simple-plurali ty decision-making schemes. What is Jmown is largely 
confined to the abstratc structures of various aggregate preference 
relations. For example, we can say how Simple Majori ty Prefere(Jile and 
the Single Transf erjable Vote match up on desiderata such as 
"anonymi ty", "neutrali ty", or "independence of irrelevant alternatives", 
but we have little idea about how s trategic agents - candidates for 
office, voters, etc. - would behave differentially under these 
mechanisms, or what the difference in the final policy outcomes might 
be, in an otherwise fixed environment. 
1bis pa.per develops a multi-stage game-theoretic model of three 
party competi tion under propor tional representation. 1be particular PR 
mechanism assumed has two par ts. Firs t, at the election s tage, a 
fixed-standard, or quota, rule determines the composi tion of the 
legislature. And second, in the elected legislature, a noncooperative 
bargaining process determines the membership of the government, the 
distribution of por tfolios across this membership, and the f inal policy 
outcome. 1be legislative bargaining process i s  def ined both by the 
relative electoral vote shares of parties - the "weights" of the parties 
in the legislature - and by the policy platforms they adopt to contes t  
the election. As claimed in the Introduction and establi shed in the 
subsequent sections of the pa.per, the identi f ied equilibria to this game 
have three main substantive features : 
(1) 1be government consists of the parties wi th the largest and the 
smalles t  weights. Hence, the legislative influence of an elected party 
is not monotonic in i ts vote share; 
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(2) Parties ' electoral platforms are symmetrical ly distributed 
about the median voter ' s ideal point in the one-dimensional issue space. 
1be party adopting this posi tion to contest the election receives the 
smal lest  number of votes, and the remaining parties have an equal 
l ikel ihood of being first-ranked in the legislature. 1berefore , by 
conclusion ( 1) ,  the expected final pol icy outcome wi l l  be at the median 
voter ' s  ideal point, but the realized final outcome wi l l  l ie between the 
median and e i ther the right-most ,  or the lef t-most ,  party ' s posi tion: 
(3) Not al l individuals vote sincerely for the party platforms they 
most prefer. So, even with equi l ibrium party platforms , vote-shares 
wi l l  not reflect the true distribution of preferecnes of the e lectorate. 
1be comparison with the two-party, winner-take-al l, electoral 
mechanism in this  environment is straightforward. In this case : 
( 1') 1be party with the most votes has monopol istic control of the 
legis lature. Legi s lative influence , therefore, is monotonic in votes: 
(2') In equ i l ibrium, both parties adopt the median voter's 
posi tion, and thi s  is surely the final policy outcome: 
(3 ' )  A l l  voters vote sincerely, whether or not the parties adopt 
the equi l ibrium pol icy platforms. 
In sum , the popular conception that, in contrast with 
simple-plura l i ty schemes, proportional representation leads to 
legislatures , and hence to f inal policy outcomes , which ref lect the 
variety of interes ts in the e lectorate , seems mistaken. Such a 
conception rest on the more-or-less implicit  assumption of non-strategic 
behavior by the voters and par ties which, on both theoretical and 
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empirical grounds, is  unwarranted. Having said thi s ,  two caveats should 
be noted in regard to the model here. 
Firs t ,  the question of entry into the electoral compet i tion i s  
ignored , 1bis is clearly important ,  since the number of candidates or 
parties contesting the election wi l l  be functional ly dependent on the 
particular electoral and legislative schemes in place. However , 
allowing free entry , say , is not going to remove the incentives for 
strategic behavior by the voters in the e lection, and the logic of the 
l egislative bargaining process studied in thi s  paper is  invariant to the 
number of parties in the legislature (although the location of the f inal 
policy outcome is, of course sensi t ive to this  number). 
Second, the equi l ibrium location of the three parties ' pol i cy 
platforms depends on the specification of the (equi l ibrium) voting 
behavior for any set of platforms . If voting s trategies are al tered , 
then the associated equ i l ibrium party pol icies wi l l  be al tered as wel l. 
Unl ike in two-party competi tion, sincere voting by everyone i s  not 
capable of  suppor ting any equi l ibrium in party posi tions ; s trategic 
voting is  essential to generate stable  outcomes. Moreover , as we argued 
earl ier in the text, no voting strategy is weakly dominated - i . e. 
suppose we f ix party pos i tions , and f ix some individual ' s (j ' s) vote 
arbi trari ly; then there exi s ts a distribution of votes by others such 
that j voting otherwise makes him str ictly worse off. Consequently, for 
any distribution of party platforms there is a mul tipl ici ty of 
undominated voting equi l ibria, and the selection of exactly which one to 
adopt in order to solve for the electoral equ i l ibrium in party platforms 
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is somewhat arbitrary. The criterion used here was to insist/ that, in 
�electoral equilibrium, every voter must be pivotal, i. e. capable of 
unilaterally altering the final policy outcome from the legislative 
bargaining process by affecting the rank-order of parties ' electoral 
vote-shares. This is a non-trivial prerequisite which refines the set 
. 
of admiss�ble equilibria considerably. But it is clear that work needs 
to be done on this problem. 
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Appendix 
Proposition 1 The following constitute the legislative equilibrium 
coalitions and outcomes : 
* 
1) if wM = max {w1, wM, wR}' then C = {M, k}, where wk = min {w1, wM, wR}' 
* * 
Y = PM' gM = G; 
2) if WL > WM > WR' then c
* 
= {L.R} and if
(a) dL � dR' 
(b) d1 > dR, 
* * 
then y = PM' gL = G; 
* * 2 * * then y = PLR' gR = (PLR - PR) • and gL = G - gR; 
* 
3) if wR > wM > w1 . then C = {
R,L} and if
* * 2 * * (a) dL � dR, then y = pLR' gL = (PLR - pR) , and gR = G - g1: 
* * 
(b) dL ) dR' then y = PM' gR = G; 
4) if WL > WR > WM and dL � dR' then c
* 
= {L, M} and 
L M M 2 2 
a) if 2d1 � dR' y = pLM'  gM = (PLM - pM) - (PRL - pM) , and 
* * 
gL = G - gM; 
* * 
5) if w1 ) WR ) WM and dL ) dR' then C = {
L, M}, y = pLM' 
* 2 2 * * gM = (PM - PLM) - (pRM - �) ' and gL = G - gM; 
* * 
6) if WR ) w1 ) WM and dL ( dR' then C = {
R, M}, y = pMR' 
* 2 2 * * gM = (PMR - PM) - (pM - PML) ' and gR = G - gM; 
* 
7) if WR ) w1 ) WM and d1 � dR' then C = {
R,M} and 
* * 2 2 a) if dL � 2dR' y = PMR' gM = (PM - PRM) - (PM - pRL) ' and 
* * 
gR = G - gM; 
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Next, we state and prove the formal version of Proposition 2. For any p 
Proposition 2 The following n-tuple a* of voter strategies is a voting 
equilibrium for any s E [3, n/3) , s odd: 
* la) PL = PM = PR => ai(k) = 1/3, Vi EN, V k E 0.
b) PL = PM < PR =>
* * ai(
R) = 1, i = µ-1, .. . , n; ai(k) 1/2, i 1, . . .  , µ-2, k=L,
M. 
c) PL < PM = PR =>
* * ai(L) = 1, i = l, . .. , µ+1; ai(k) = 1/2, i = µ+2, . . .  , n, k=
L, M. 
2) PL < PM < PR and IBicl � (n+l) /2, some k E O => 
* 0 ai = ai' Vi EN.
Now suppose that PL < PM ( pR and IBicl ( (n+l) /2, V k E 0 .
(pL, pR) ' and 
Then x E µ 
* * 3a) xµ >PM => ai(M) = l, i = l, . .. , s; a1(R) = l, i = s+l, . .. , n. 
* * b) xµ < PM => ai(L) = l, i = l, . .. , n-s; ai(
M) = l, i = n-s+l, .. . , n. 
4) xµ = PM and dL < (>) dR => a7 = a1
{L, M} (a1{
R, M}) ,  Vi EN. 
5) xµ = PM and dL = dR = d ( (x(2µ+s-l)/2 - xµ) •S/3 => 
* * * {L 
R} aµ(L) = aµ(
R) = 1/2; a1 = a1 ' , V i � µ. 
6) xµ = PM and dL = dR = d � (x(2µ+s-l) /2 - xµ) •S/3 =>
* a1(L) = 1, i = l, . . .  , (2µ-s-3) /2, 
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* ai(
M) = l, i = (2µ-s-1) /2, . .. , (2µ+s-1) /2,
* ai(
R) = l, = (2µ+s+l) /2, . . .  , n. 
Proof. 
la) Suppose p = (y, y, y). Then A(p) = {y}, in which case all voters are 
indifferent over voting strategies. Hence a*(p) as specified is an 
equilibrium. 
lb) Suppose p = (y' , y', pR) ' where pR > y' = pL = pM. Then
A(p)={y', (y'+pR) /2, pR}' vR(a*(p) ) � (n+3) /2, and y(w(a*(p) ) , p) = pR. 
* Clearly all i E �are using maximizing strategies. And given a (p) , no 
i E � is pivotal between {pL, pM} and pR. Hence a*(p) is an
equilibrium. 
le) An argument symmetric to that used in lb) applies. 
2) If IBk(P) I � (n+l)/2, for some kEO, then a7(k) = 1 is clearly a best
response for any i E Bk(p) , since y(w(a*) , p) = pk. And given a_7, no i 
E N\Bk is pivotal between pk and any other possible outcome. 
a*(p) is an equilibrium. 
Hence, 
3a) In this instance, vR(a*(p)) = n-s) 2n/3, so that y(w(a*(p) ) , p) = 
PR· Since no individual is pivotal, a*(p) is an equilibrium. Mutatis 
mutandis, the same is true for case 3b) . 
* 4) Suppose xµ = pM and dL< dR. Then vM(a (p) ) � (n+l) /2 and
y(w(a*(p) ) , p) = pM. If any individual i is pivotal, then a7(M) 1 and
* * * vM(a (p) ) = vL(a (p) ) +l = (n+l)/2. Since s � 3, ai � ai implies 
* y(w(ai, a-i) , p) � PM' with strict inequality if ai is a pure strategy.
But [xµ=PM' vM(a*(p) )=(n+l)/2, and a1
{L, M}(M)=l] implies xi� pM. 
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Hence, a*(p) is an equilibrium. A symmetric argument holds when dL > 
dR. 
5) By definition of pM and d, the argument for this case follows 
immediately from that of case 6), below. 
* * * * 6) Given a (p) , vL(a (p)) = vR(a (p) ) = (n-s)/2 > vM(a (p)) = s. Hence, 
y(w(a*(p) ) , p) € {pLM, pMR}' where each occurs with probability 1/2. By 
supposition, dL = dR = d. 1bus, for all j € N, 
* 2 2 Euj(y(w(a (p) ) , p) )  = -(xj - pM) - d /4. 
Consider any i such that a7(M) = 1, and suppose i switches to ai{R) = 1. 
* * * 1ben, vR(ai, a-i) = (n-s+2) /2 > vL(ai, a-i) = (n-s)/2) vM(ai, a-i) = s-1. 
Hence M is not elected to the legislature, and y(w(ai, a_7) , p) = pR. In
this event, i' s utility is 
* 2 Eui(y(w{ai, a-i) , p) )  = -(xi - PR) . 
1berefore, 
* * Eui(y(w(a (p) ) , p) - Eui(y{w(ai, a-i) , p) )  < 0 <=> 
2 1.. 2 (xi-pR) - (xi-pM) - d /4 ( 0 <=> 
2 [(xi-pR) - (xi-pM) ] •[(xi-pR) + (xi-pM) ]  - d /4 < O <=> 
xi > PM + 3d/8. 
Similarly, if ai(
L) = 1 for any i su�h that a7(M) = 1, 
* * Eui(y(w(a (p) ) , p) )  - Eui(y(w{ai, a-i) , p) )  < 0 <=> xi < pM -3d/8. 
By definition of this case, d � (x{2.µ+s-l)/2-pM}•8/3. Hence, all i such 
* that ai(
M) = 1 are using best responses. Now consider any i such that 
* ai{L} = 1. If ai{k) = l, kE{
M, R}, then, because 3 � s ( n/3, all
* parties get elected and y(w(ai, a-i) , p) = pMR with probability 1.
Hence, 
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* Hence, ai(L) = 1 is a best response for 
such individuals. By symmetry, * ai(
R) = 1 is a best response for i ) 
{2.µ+s+l)/2. 1bis completes the proof of case 6) [and case 5) ].  
Proposition 3 Relative to the voting strategies of Proposition 2, 
p* € PxPxP is an electoral equilibrium for any s € [3, n/3) , s odd, 
if and only if: 
* (1) PM = xµ' 
* * * * (2) (PM - PL) =  (PR - PM) €  [8/3•{xi* - xµ) , 4•(xj* - xµ) ) ,
where i* = µ + (s-1)/2, j* = µ + int[(n-1) /4]. 
Proof. 
D 
(suff.) Suppose p* satisfies (1) and (2) . 1ben a*(p*) is described by 
the voter strategies of case 6} of the voting equilibrium. Hence, 
* *  * *  * *  * *  * vL(a (p ) )  = vR(a (p ) )  = (n-s)/2 > s = vM(a (p ) ) ,  and y(w(a (p ) ) , p ) 
* * * * * E {pLM, pMR}. Let {PM - Pk}= d , k=L,
R. Since each outcome occurs with 
probability 1/2, Proposition 1 yields: 
�L(p*) = �R(p*) = l/2•(G - d*
2/4) - d*2 - d*2/4 = G/2 - ll/8·d*2, 
* �M(p ) = 0. 
* By the assumption on the size of G, �k(P ) > 0, k=L,
R. 
. * * * * * Consider p = {pL, p' pR) and suppose that p € (pL, pM) .  Since pM = 
xµ' l�(P) I  < {n+l)/2, V kEO. Hence case 3a) of the voting equilibrium
obtains at p, in which case vM(a*(p) ) = s, vR(a*(p) ) = n-s, and 
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* 2 Therefore, tM(p) = -(p-pR) < 0. Now suppose p = 
* * PL' Then case lb) of the voti ng equi librium obtai ns , and vR(a (p) ) 
* * * (n+l}/2, so that y(w(a (p) ) , p) = pR. Therefore tM(p) < 0. If p < PL' 
then agai n case 3a} of the voti ng equilibri um obtai ns, but here 
* vM(a (p) ) = 0 so that tM(p) = -c ( 0 .  A symmetric argument holds for p 
* * . * * > pM. Thus, pM 1 s  a best response to (pL, pR) .
Consider p = (p, p;.p�) and suppose that p Then case 4) of
the voting equi libri um obtai ns with dL ) dR' i n  which case vL(a*(p) ) = 
* * 0, and tL(p) = -c ( 0 .  Suppose p€(pL, pM) .  Then case 4) agai n obtai ns,
with dL < dR' in which case vM(a*(p) ) � (n+l} /2. Therefore 
( * * 2 * Y w(a (p) ) , p) = PM and tL(p) = -(p - pM) ( 0 .  Suppose p = pM. Then 
case lb} of the voting equi libri um obtai ns; EvL(a*(p)) = (n-3)/4 < 
* * 2 * vR(a (p) ) = (n+3} /2, and tL(p) € {-c , -(p - pR) } ( 0 .  If p ) pM' then
case 2) of the voting equi librium obtai ns, so that vM(a*(p} ) � (n+l)/2 
* 2 * and tL(p) € {-c, -(p - pM) } < O. Therefore, pL i s  a best response to
* * * * * (pM, pR) .  By symmetry, PR i s  a best response to (pL , pM) .
(nee. ) We prove necessity by fi rst showing that i f  p € PxPxP is such 
that one of cases 1) - 5) of the voting equi librium obtai ns, then p 
cannot be an electoral equi libri um. Let ](a*) be the set of electoral 
equi libria relati ve to the voter strategi es a*. 
Let p = (y , y , y) .  Then tk(p) = G/3, V k € O. Consi der party a. If 
Y # x , choosing p '= x implies IB (x , y , y) I  ) (n+l) /2 , so that µ a µ a µ -
ta(xµ , y , y) )  = G. If Y = xµ' choose pa') y. Then case lb) of the voting
equi librium obtai ns, i n  which case va(a
*(p) ) = (n+3) /2 > Evk(a*(p) ) , k ¢ 
a. Thus ta(pa
', y , y) = G. Therfore, p ( !(a*) .
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Let p = (pa , y, y) and suppose pa ) y. Consider party /3. At p, case
lb} of the voti ng equi librium obtai ns. Therefore, t13(p) € {-c, -(y -
pa)
2}. If p ¢ x , choose p/3
'= x . Then either case 2} or 4) obtai ns. a µ µ 
In either case, v13(pa , xµ, y) � (n+l} /2 and t13(pa, xµ, y) = G. If Pa = xµ' 
choose p/3
') x such that (p/3
' - x ) ( (x - y)/t,  t � 2. Then case 4)µ µ µ 
of the voting equi librium obtai ns with dL ) dR' so that v7(pap/3 ' , y) = 0 
< v13(pa, p/3 ' , y) < va(pa, p/3 ' , y) .  Hence for suffici ently large t ,
t13(Pa •P13 ' , y) = -(p/3 ' - Pa)
2 > max  t13(p).
Therefore, p ( ](a*) .  By symmetry , the same is true for pa < y.
Let p = (pa , p/3 , p7) and suppose all parti es adopt disticnt 
posi tions. Then we can write p = (pL, pM, pR). Let p be such that case 
2} of the voting equilibrium occurs. Suppose IBL(P) I � (n+l} /2, and 
consi der p ' = (pL, pM, p) .  By the assumption of symmetric utilities ,  xµ ( 
(pL+pM) /2. If PL # xµ' choose p = xµ. Then ei ther case 2} occurs or 
case 4). In both cases, vR(p') � (n+l} /2, so that tR(p') = G > tR(p) . 
Then 
case 4) occurs at p '  with dL < dR. Thus we have tR(p') > max  tR(p) for
suffici ently large t. Therefore, i f  p € !(a*) and case 2) of the voti ng 
equi libri um occurs, IBL(P) I ( (n+l) /2; by symmetry , IBR(P) I  < (n+l)/2. 
And i f  IBM(P) I  � (n+l)/2, the same arguments, mutatis mutandis ,  apply. 
Therefore, p ( ](a*) 
Let p = (pL, pM, pR) and assume hereafter that l�(p) I ( (n+l)/2, for
k = L , M, R. 
Suppose that xµ ) pM. * Then vL(a (p)) = 0 and tL(p) = -c. Assume 
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offering PL in p now offers xµ
. Then case 4) occurs and tL(p' ) = G > 
tL(p) . Now assume (pM+pR)/2 = xµ 
and consider p '  = (pL , xµ
, pR) ' where
the par ty offering PM in p now offers xµ
. Then again case 4) occurs ,  
and tM(p ' )  = G > tM(p) = -(pM-pR)
2 . So p t 2(a*) ;  by symmetry the same 
i s  true when x
µ 
(. pM . 
Let P = (pL , pM , pR) = (pL ,xµ
, pR) and suppose dL # dR. Then case 4) 
of the voting equi l ibrium occurs and vk(a
*(p) ) = 0 for some k = L ,R . 
Let k = L so that dL > dR ' and tL(p) = -c . Consider p '  = (p , pM, pR
) ' p < 
PM and (pM-p) = (pR-pM}/t , t�2. Then case 4) obtains at p' and dL ' ( 
dR ' = dR . Hence , vL(a
*(p) ) � s and , for sufficiently large t ,  tL(p ' )  > 
tL(p} . Therefore , p t  2(a
*) ;  by symmetry , the same is true when k = R . 
Let P = (pL , pM ,pR) = {pL
,x
µ
,pR) and suppose dL = dR = d ( 
8/3• (x{2µ+s-l)/2 
- x
µ
) · Then case 5) of the voting equi l ibrium occurs .
* Hence , vM(a (p) ) = 0 and tM(p) = -c . Consider p' = (pL ,pM-c ' pR) ' c)O . 
Then case 3a) of the voting equi l ibrium occurs with x
µ 
> pM-c ' in which
case vM(a
*(p' ) )  = s and tM(p ' )  = - {d+c)
2 . Therefore , 
tM(p ' )  - tM{p) = c - {d+c}
2 > O <=> 
2 c - d > c • (2d+c) . 
By assumption, c � 8/3{(x(2µ+s-l)/2 - xµ) J2 > d2, so for sufficiently
smal l c, tM(p' ) > tM(p) . Therefore , p t  2(a
*) .
Put ting the previous arguments together , we have that p E 2{a*) 
impl ies a*(p) i s  such that case 6) of the voting equ i l ibrium occurs . To 
complete the argument for necess i ty ,  note that , by the symmetry of voter 
preferences and the distribution of ideal points , 
[PM = xµ ' 
dL = dR = d ,  and d � 4• {xjM-xµ
) J  => 
IBM{P) I � {n+l }/2 . a 
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